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In this work, water distribution systems are regarded as large sparse planar graphs
with complex network characteristics and the relationship between important topo-
logical features of the network (i.e. structural robustness and loop redundancy) and
system resilience, viewed as the antonym to structural vulnerability, are assessed.
Deterministic techniques from complex networks and spectral graph theory are uti-
lized to quantify well-connectedness and estimate loop redundancy in the studied
benchmark networks. By using graph connectivity and expansion properties, system
robustness against node/link failures and isolation of the demand nodes from the
source(s) are assessed and network tolerance against random failures and targeted
attacks on their bridges and cut sets are analyzed. Among other measurements,
two metrics of meshed-ness and algebraic connectivity are proposed as candidates
for quantification of redundancy and robustness, respectively, in optimization design
models. A brief discussion on the scope and limitations of the provided measurements
in the analysis of operational reliability of water distribution systems is presented.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc Networks and genealogical trees - 89.75.Fb Structures and
organization in complex systems - 89.40.Cc Water transportation - 89.20.-a Interdis-
ciplinary applications of physics - 89.65.Lm Urban planning and construction
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I. INTRODUCTION
The resistance and vulnerability of infrastructure systems exposed to perturbations and
hazards is becoming a more important consideration during the design and operation of
such systems. Water distribution systems are among the most critical infrastructures which
are subject to numerous perturbations ranging from the common failures (e.g. breakdown
of the ageing pipes and pumping units causing low pressure and disruptions to supply)
to the security risks and exposure of the networks to natural or man-made disasters (e.g.
earthquakes, flooding, vandalism, etc). The ability of the system to resist, mitigate and
overcome stresses and failures and their consequences is consequently receiving increased
attention from the managers and system engineers with robustness and resilience gradually
becoming very important considerations along with the more typical considerations of low
cost and reliable operation. Moreover, proper understanding of the vulnerable and critical
locations in distribution systems provides invaluable information that may be used to in-
form asset management practices and rehabilitation programs leading to more realistic risk
assessments and the development of defensive strategies to ensure network survival in the
case of extreme events and natural or man-made disasters. Reliable assessment of water
distribution network (WDN) performance in the face of various stresses is dependent on
close and clear definition of network characteristics such as resilience and robustness. A
resilient system shows (i) Reduced failure probabilities (ii) Reduced failure consequences
and (iii) Reduced time to recovery, characterized by four infrastructural qualities of robust-
ness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity (Bruneau et al., 2003) which incorporates the
notions of risk (probability of failure and its consequences), reliability, recovery and system
tolerance pre- and post-failure. While a comprehensive assessment of resilience to include
resourcefulness and rapidity requires operational considerations and access to field data,
this work is confined to quantifying structural robustness and redundancy as topological
aspects of network resilience. Structural robustness is the optimal connectivity of network
components which gives rise to higher tolerance against disruption of operation as a result
of component failures. Redundancy, a similar indicator of network connectivity, is the pres-
ence of independent alternative paths (usually looped structures) between the source and
demand nodes which can be used to satisfy supply requirements during disruption or failure
of the main paths.
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Complex networks are governed by communication and distribution laws in such a
way that the behavior and interaction of the individual elements, taken together with the
non-trivial network configurations, may cause the overall system performance to be much
different from the sum of the performances of the individual parts. Examples of such net-
works range from the internet and communication networks to urban roads and power grids
with typical complexities and uncertainties observed in network congestions, traffic jams
or power cuts. Analysis of the vulnerability of complex networks using graph theory tech-
niques is concerned with the study of network building blocks and motifs and identification
of structural weaknesses, critical locations and impacts of failures of core components and
highly connected nodes known as the hubs (Albert et al. 2000). This is usually carried out
using simulation techniques which assess the impacts on efficiency and performance of the
network as a result of random failures or successive targeted attacks (Crucitti et al. 2005).
Notable studies concerned with the structural analysis and assessment of the vulnerability
in complex networks among other sectors include resilience of urban transport networks
(Zio and Sansavini 2007, Masucci et al. 2009), vulnerability of power grids (Bompard et.
al 2009, Crucitti et al. 2005 and Holmgren 2006) and the World Wide Web (Albert et
al. 1999). Furthermore, other methodologies are proposed that analyze the scenarios of
cascading failures in the networks, along with the traditional path-based methods in the
analysis of infrastructure network reliability (Dueas-Osorio and Vemuru, 2009).
Despite the extensive use of graph models in the analysis of pipe networks (Kesavan and
Chandrashekar 1972, Gupta and Prasad 2000 and Deuerlein 2008) vulnerability and robust-
ness of WDNs has not been systematically exposed to the analyses by graph theory and
complex network techniques. Among the few works in this area, are the work by Jacobs and
Goulter (1988, 1989) who showed that networks that are most invulnerable to failures are
regular graphs with equal number of links incident to each node, while the inverse relation-
ship is not necessarily true due to the existence of bridges (links whose removal disconnects
the network) and articulation points (nodes whose removal along with the removal of their
incident links disconnects the network). Kessler et al. (1990) used graph theory to develop
a methodology for least-cost design of invulnerable WDNs by incorporating reliability in
the design of the network. Ostfeld and Shamir (1996) and Ostfeld (2005) utilized graphs to
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study the selection of one-level system redundancy ”backups” in a WDN undergoing failure.
However, the use of purely topological graph theory in reliability analysis of WDNs was
shown to have limited scope. Walski (1993) showed that link-node representation does not
account for the importance of the valves in a WDN reliability analysis. Ostfeld and Shamir
(1993) classified failures into two types of: (1) failures of system components (2) failures in
meeting consumers demands, and emphasized that ”these two types of failures should not
be considered separately” as they are strongly connected. The analysis of the connectivity,
reliability and risk-based design of WDNs, on the other hand, have been extensively dealt
with using simulations, optimization algorithms and non-deterministic techniques (Ostfeld
2004, Babayan et al. 2005 and Kapelan et al. 2006). In general, network reliability deals
with the assessment of probability of link or node failure while vulnerability, viewed here
as the antonym to robustness, is more concerned with the impacts of failed components or
subsystems. While a thorough reliability analysis may not be viable by using purely topo-
logical metrics only, structural vulnerability and robustness of WDNs may still be studied
within such a framework. Moreover, as demonstrated later, recent advancements in the
field of complex networks in terms of the available network measurements, prove invaluable
towards quantification of structural properties of distributed systems and understanding
robustness and redundancy, as two topological components of reliability and the level of
available service to the consumers, that in turn may be used as parameters within the frame-
work of design models to optimize network reliability against size and cost. However, given
that such topological analysis of water distribution networks does not take into account the
operational specifications of water systems and the level of service provided to consumers,
it may only be regarded as an assessment of the ”necessary conditions” (Ostfeld, 2001) for
supplying required demand for water.
The aim of this work is to provide more insight towards resilience or vulnerability of water
distribution systems by looking at the connectivity patterns and network configurations.
In particular, techniques from ”Complex Networks” and ”Graph Theory” are employed to
estimate redundancy and quantify robustness against node/link failures in WDNs. A WDN
with multiple interconnected elements is represented as a link-node planar graph which
comprises of nodes for features at specific locations and links which define the relationship
between such nodes. It is common to represent pipes by links and junctions such as pipe
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intersections, reservoirs and consumers by graph nodes. With such representations, WDNs
resemble complex networks where network reliability and the severity of disruption as a
result of failures depend on network layout and structure of the cycles and loops as alterna-
tive supply paths. The key observation here is that ”structure affects function” (Strogatz
2001) as network architecture reveals important information on robustness, vulnerability
and possible operational consequences as a result of component failures. The present analy-
sis utilizes spectral graph theory and statistical measurement of complex networks to study
the structure of some benchmark WDNs in relation to robustness and vulnerability and
quantify robustness and redundancy as the two topological aspects of network resilience.
Basic connectivity metrics, spectral gap and algebraic connectivity along with the statisti-
cal measurements such as clustering coefficient, meshed-ness, central-point dominance and
degree distribution are deployed to signify features related to graph robustness and strength
such as bottlenecks, structural holes and cut vertices. Such intuitive and relatively easy
to implement methodology reveals important information on structural vulnerability and
resilience to perturbations in water networks. Consequently, topological assessment, ideally,
may be used as a decision-making support methodology in relation to the design and con-
struction of robust and optimally-connected next-generation of WDNs.
II. NETWORK MODELS AND STRUCTURAL METRICS
The theory of complex networks employs techniques from graph theory and statistical
physics to classify different network models, to analyze their structural complexities and
quantify the vulnerability, robustness and error and attack tolerance of the networks (Al-
bert et al. 2000). Complex networks typically belong to one of the groups of: technological,
biological, social or information networks (Newman, 2003) with their topological structures
categorized as: centralized, decentralized and distributed depending on the underlying hier-
archical or redundant configurations. Selection of a relevant set of statistical measurements
to analyze network robustness is, however, largely determined by the fact that WDNs are
spatial technological networks and need to be treated as planar graphs. Throughout, a
network is represented as a mathematical graph G = G(V,E) in which V is the set of all
graph nodes with n elements and E is the set of graph edges with m elements. Table (I)
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TABLE I. Summary of structural metrics used to assess redundancy and robustness of networks
Metric Definition Equation Refernce Quantifying
Link density The fraction between the total and the maximum
number of links
q = 2m
n(n−1) Jamakovic and
Uhlig (2007)
Redundancy
Average node-degree Average value of the node-degree distribution < k >= 2m
n
Costa et al.
(2007)
Robustness
Meshed-ness The fraction between the total and the maximum
number of independent loops in planar graphs
Rm =
m−n−1
2n−5 Buhl et al.(2006) Redundancy
Diameter The maximum geodesic length of the shortest path
between all pairs of nodes
d = max(dij) Costa et al.
(2007)
Robustness
Average path length Average value of the geodesic distances between all
pairs of nodes
l = 1
n(n−1) Σ(ij)dij Costa et al.
(2007)
Robustness
Clustering coefficient The fraction between the total triangles and the total
connected triples
C =
3N∆
N3
Wasserman and
Faust (1994)
Redundancy
Central-point dominance Average difference in betweenness of the most central
point and all others
CB =
1
(n−1) Σi(Bmax − Bi) Freeman(1997) Robustness
Spectral gap The difference between first and second eigenvalues of
graph’s adjacency matrix
∆λ Estrada (2006) Robustness
Algebraic connectivity The second smallest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix
of the network
λ2 Fiedler (1973) Robustness
provides a brief definition of some of the measurements related to network robustness and
redundancy together with an indication of which water distribution network characteris-
tic is being assessed through each metric. Water distribution systems could be potentially
weighted bi-directional networks, given the pipes and nodes physical attributes and the pos-
sibility of flow redirection which may take place as a result of the failures and isolation of
network parts. In general, the direction of network flow and weighting allocated to graph
links or nodes is determined by physical and operational parameters and the costs associated
with water supply in networks under study for which no data was available and hence the
studied networks are treated as undirected and unweighted graphs. Moreover, WDNs in
this analysis are assumed to be planar graphs so that graph edges intersect only at a node
mutually incident with them (Chartrand and Lesniak, 1996).
The metrics introduced are mainly divided into two groups of statistical and spectral
measurements. Statistical measurements are those which quantify organizational properties
of the network based on the most frequent motifs and structural patterns and relate them
to network robustness and the dynamics on network. Such measurements range from more
basic metrics such as network size n, network order m, link density, number of independent
loops given as Nl = m − n + 1 and graph diameter d, to other statistical metrics includ-
ing degree distribution and average node-degree < k >, meshed-ness for planar graphs
defined as Rm , clustering coefficient C and central-point dominance CB as a measure of
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relative betweenness centrality or network centralization. Spectral metrics derived from the
spectrum of network adjacency matrix, quantify network invariants that, taken along with
the described statistical measurements, reveal useful information on well-connectedness of
the network, connectivity strength and failure tolerance. Two basic yet important such
connectivity metrics are link-connectivity and node-connectivity (Kessler et al. 1990) which
quantify the minimum number of attacks or failures required to render a group of the nodes
disconnected. In general, the value of node-connectivity is smaller than link-connectivity
which could be interpreted that the existence of unreliable network nodes may have more
severe consequences in terms of the failures and recovery than the existence of unreliable
network links. However, these measurements may become trivial in WDNs as a result of low
redundancy and sparseness at transmission or sub-urban levels and due to single-connections
to which supply water to the end-users. Therefore, alternative connectivity measures such
as ”spectral gap” and ”algebraic connectivity” (Table I) are employed in this analysis in
order to quantify well-connectedness and strength of the network connections. Using above
graph representations, the Laplacian (or Kirchhoff) matrix of graph G with n nodes is a
nn matrix L = D − A where D = diag(di) and di is the degree of node i and A = (aij)
is the adjacency matrix of G where aij = 1 if there is a link between nodes i and j and
aij = 0 otherwis. Spectral gap ∆ is the difference between first and second eigenvalues of
adjacency matrix A and is used to identify Good Expansion (GE) properties in graphs. GE
networks are those with their topology of network-connections structured such that ”any set
of vertices connects in a robust way to other nodes, even if the graph is sparse” (Donneti et.
al, 2006). Non-GE networks are those with the presence of bottlenecks, articulation points
or bridges and are easily split and isolated into two or more parts by removing those nodes
or links. A necessary condition for GE property is that the spectral gap is sufficiently large
(Estrada, 2006) and hence a small spectral gap may indicate the lack of GE properties. An-
other spectral measurement quantifying the strength of network connections is the algebraic
connectivity, defined as the second smallest eigen-value of graph Laplacian matrix L Fiedler
(1973) and extensively discussed in Mohar (1991), Ghosh and Boyd (2006) and Jamakovic
and Uhlig (2007) for its properties and applications towards analysis of graph robustness
to node and link failures. While the smallest eigenvalue of graph Laplacian is zero and
its multiplicity equals the number of connected components in a network, larger value of
algebraic connectivity indicates the fault tolerance of the network and its robustness against
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efforts to cut it into parts. In the following section, statistical and spectral measurements
for the studied benchmark water distribution models are derived and their relationship to
network robustness and vulnerability is interpreted.
III. CASE STUDIES AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Four benchmark water distribution networks are studied and their structural properties
explored. These networks, listed below, are among the models reported in the literature
with their data-files accessible online at the University of Exeter Centre for Water Systems
(CWS Benchmarks, 2007) and depicted in the Figure (1). The selected networks include two
real-world and two hypothetical models chosen from a set of networks with different sizes
and structures proving some diversity in terms of the network structures and data analysis.
1. The ”Anytown” design example proposed by Walski et al. (1987); a small hypothetical
network with nearly regular lattice-like structure. The particular all-channel structure entails
high redundancy which in turn improves network connectivity and makes the network failure-
tolerant. Nodes with degrees five and two are the most frequent types of connection and
low graph diameter and the dominance of triangular paths are the main characteristics of
the network.
2. The ”Colorado Springs Utilities” reported in Lippai (2005); a large real sparse network
with mesh-like structures and redundant rectangular loops more frequent than triangular
configurations at local distribution levels. However, structural holes are viewed in the net-
work profile at a more global view which suggests that large segments of the network can
be disconnected by failure of a relatively small number of nodes or links.
3. The ”EXNET” proposed by Farmani et al. (2004); a very large hypothetical sparse
network that enjoys redundant triangular and trapezoidal configurations. Despite the exis-
tence of a few highly connected nodes (hubs) which leave the network vulnerable to attacks
and random failures of these hubs, decentralized network structure and high redundancy
may help to improve robustness and network efficiency under normal circumstances or in
the case of failures.
4. The ”Richmond” example from UK Yorkshire Water reported in Van Zyl et al. (2004);
a medium size real sparse network with high link density in the urban centre and a very
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FIG. 1. Total network graph view of studied water distribution networks; Anytown (top-left),
Colorado Springs Utilities (top-right), EXENET (bottom-left), Richmond (bottom-right).
sparse configuration elsewhere. This network has an unusual geographic spread where given
the low loop redundancy in the suburban areas (where the reservoirs and water supply
sources are located) may result in large-scale disruptions as a result of failure of pipes or the
outage of system component at network upstream. This specific network layout indicates the
existence of geographical and urban constraints and that this water distribution network has
evolved and expanded over a longer period of time than as an outcome of a single optimized
construction. Network analysis is undertaken using the open-source graph manipulation
software ”igraph” (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006) which can be used as an extension package on
statistical computing software ”R” (R Development Core Team, 2009) available free online.
Calculations of the network measurements take place in few simple steps listed below:
1. Install and call igraph library package in R environment (other library packages such
as ”matrix”, ”stats” or ”graph” might be required depending on the undertaken analysis).
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2. Read the network file, structured in a format supported by igraph functions for reading
external files.
3. For each measurement use the associated functions, directly or in combination with
others, by using ”R” commands.
4. Most of the calculations are performed in linear or polynomial computation time
depending on the used function and network size (Csardi and Nepusz, igraph Reference
Manual).
Some of the basic topological and statistical measurements of these benchmark models
are summarized in Table (II).
Numerical calculations presented in Table (II) relate to the following observations: Firstly,
the studied WDNs are sparse networks with very low values of link density (Table II). The
”Anytown” network has a relatively higher link density while still regarded a sparse network.
It is observed that high link-density does not necessarily imply high level of loop redundancy,
particularly in tree-like networks spread linearly against the plane (e.g. ”Richmond”). Sec-
ondly, the average node degree in the studied WDNs is particularly low and cumulative
degree distribution of these networks follow exponential or uniform trends (Figure 2), which
may have implications on robustness or well-conceived the network layouts are, viewed
along with the expansion properties discussed in the next section. The studied networks
are to a large extent (though not strictly) planar graphs where most of the graph links
intersect at their endpoints. In such networks the graph structures usually range between
simple tree-like networks (corresponding to < k >= 2) and two dimensional regular lattices
TABLE II. Basic network measurements for the benchmark water networks (n = nodes, m = links,
q = link density, M = maximum node-degree, Nl = number of independent loops, < k > =average
node-degree, d = diameter, l = average path-length, CB = central-Point dominance)
Network Network Type n m q M Nl < k > d l CB
Anytown Hypothetical 25 44 14.67 % 7 20 3.52 7 2.89 0.23
Colorado Springs Real 1786 1994 0.13 % 4 209 2.23 69 25.94 0.42
EXNET Hypothetical 1893 2467 0.14 % 11 575 2.60 54 20.60 0.28
Richmond Hypothetical 872 957 0.25 % 4 86 2.19 135 51.44 0.56
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FIG. 2. The GIS view (top) and the graph representation (bottom) of the two of the four water
distribution networks; ”Colorado Springs” (left) and ”Richmond” (right).
(corresponding to < k >= 4). Therefore, the number of independent loops Nl (Table 2) and
estimated network meshed-ness (Table III) as defined by Buhl et al. (2006) can be used to
evaluate the local structural properties and redundancy in the network. Finally, clustering
coefficient values (Table III) show some degree of correlation with average meshed-ness.
This is because the clustering coefficient provides a measurement of the density of triangles
among all other types of building blocks. However, due to the frequency of non-triangular
loops in the studied networks, extra care should be taken to not to use clustering coefficient
as an ultimate measure of redundancy since it only provides estimation for the density of
the transitive triangles rather than other looped motifs. Numerical measurements based
on graph adjacency matrix spectrum to quantify network robustness are given in Table (III).
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TABLE III. Redundancy and robustness quantifications for the benchmark water networks (Rm
= meshed-ness, C = clustering coefficient, ∆λ = spectral gap, λ2= algebraic Connectivity)
Network Rm C ∆λ λ2
Anytown 44.44% 0.32 1.51 0.2877
Colorado Springs 5.85% 0.0008 0.03 0.0005
Kumasi 15.21% 0.0517 0.12 0.0011
Richmond 4.95% 0.0402 0.07 0.0001
IV. DISCUSSION
Findings on structural and statistical properties of studied WDNs are comparable to
the reported measurements for other technological networks (see Newman, 2003, p11).
Technological networks are usually designed and expanded to provide the most efficient
distribution of flow and to minimize the associated costs. In the case of civil infrastructure
assets identified by geographical organizations and spatial locations of the nodes and links,
a typical network hierarchy has a sparse topology at transmission levels with less sparse
mesh-like structure at the distribution levels in urban centers. In WDNs, this is observed as
few long-distance high-capacity trunk mains at transmission level which carry water from
the source(s) to the urban sub-networks that are mostly made of the grid-like structures of
small distribution pipes with certain loop redundancy provisioned through active or standby
alternative supply routes.
The average-node degree in a WDN is generally low, mostly due to the physical con-
straints (represented through network graphs that are planar and homogeneous), which in
turn implies that a majority of the nodes or links have more or less equal importance and
failure consequences only as far as purely topological degree-related metrics are concerned.
The exception would however be the cut-vertices and cut-edges whose failures may decom-
pose the network and result in isolation of the parts from the water supply sources. This
approach may (and will) totally change, once considering characteristics such as the pipe
size and nodal demand instead of nodal degree or betweenness. The geographical spread of
WDNs is determined by the Euclidean distances between the nodes and the associated costs,
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in addition to the constraints of urban roads and other constructions, which in turn prevents
the formation of highly connected hubs and centralized network structures. Vulnerability
analysis of complex networks is largely concerned with the operational consequences of sin-
gle or multiple failures as a result of incidents and attacks on the hubs or the most central
elements exercised through scenarios of the removal of nodes (links) randomly or selectively
in decreasing order of node degrees. In the absence of the hubs in most of real WDNs, a
more realistic analysis should be focused on the other important structural features such
as bridges and bottlenecks and their relationship with GE properties in the network. It
has been found (Estrada, 2006) that complex networks with ”simultaneous existence of GE
and uniform degree distribution” are more robust against the failure of their nodes and
links. The studied WDNs are found (Figure 2) to be single-scale networks, as opposed to
several scale-free models reported for non-technological networks (Albert et al. 2000). This
is to say that the graph degree-sequence for such networks is either uniformly distributed
(such as in regular graphs or perfect grids) or it belongs to the exponential family with a
pronounced peak with typically up to a maximum of four connections per junction in real
water distribution networks.
It is impossible or very unrealistic to use a single metric to characterize network structures
or capture a lot of information on different aspects of graph robustness and vulnerability.
Therefore being able to directly compare and rank vulnerability of networks is another
function-specified problem which depends on the existence of a conclusive set of measure-
ments followed by heuristic interpretations. However, based on the above observations, it
is possible to simplify the task of the assessment of structural vulnerability or resilience to
the quantitative measurements of algebraic connectivity, spectral gap and meshed-ness co-
efficient supported by other measurements to quantify network robustness and redundancy,
respectively. Considering the algebraic connectivity, a comparison of the listed measure-
ments shows that the hypothetical network ”Anytown” is the most invulnerable against
node and link failures, with ”EXNET” being the second most robust network in the list.
Larger value of algebraic connectivity that indicate graph tolerance to the efforts to de-
compose it into isolated parts, is accompanied by larger values of spectral gap representing
GE properties and non-existence (or insignificance) of the network cut-sets and articulation
points. Small values of graph diameter and central-point dominance quantify this property
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that the network nodes are mutually reachable and the network are ordered in a decen-
tralized fashion which helps with more a more efficient and balanced distribution of flow
and smaller consequences as a result of failure of the most central components. It is worth
noting that both these networks are hypothetical models developed as a result of a more
planned optimization process with less structural randomness than is usually found in real-
world networks gradually evolved in time and understood as more static objects (Buhl et
al. 2006). Understanding the vulnerability aspects of the other two (real) networks ”Col-
orado Springs” and ”Richmond” is however, not as obvious. Larger spectral gap suggests
GE properties for ”Richmond” along with the significance of triangular loops in the net-
works characterized by clustering coefficient. However, greater algebraic connectivity and
meshed-ness coefficient quantify ”Colorado Springs” as a more robust network with higher
loop redundancy. This observation is backed up by other measurements such as slightly
larger average node-degree, smaller diameter and smaller value of central-point dominance
indicating that ”Colorado Springs” has been ordered in a more lattice-like structure and is
a less centralized better-connected network.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, applications of graph theory and complex network principles in the analysis
of vulnerability and robustness of water distribution networks are investigated. Some bench-
mark water networks with different sizes and structures were studied and their vulnerability-
related structural properties are quantified. These metrics, grouped as basic connectivity,
spectral metrics and statistical measurements, are used to relate the network structure
to resilience against failures or targeted removal of the nodes and links. This is done by
taking vulnerability as the antonym to resilience and studying the two main topological
aspects of resilience: robustness and redundancy. It is observed that water networks are
organized as homogeneous planar graphs against two dimensional Cartesian plane and hence
network vulnerability and robustness is to a great extent determined by the magnitude of
algebraic connectivity and spectral gap. Other measurements are utilized to demonstrate
that decentralized networks with smaller graph diameter, higher level of redundancy and
more lattice-like structures are connected in a more optimal fashion, with perfect grids
and regular graphs being the most invulnerable networks in this respect. The extent to
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which the investigated metrics can be used is elaborated and it was discussed that while
each graph metric captures some information on particular aspects of network robustness
and vulnerability, no unique metric can be used as the only descriptive measurement to
characterize network robustness in relation to design. A thorough assessment of network
vulnerability with the objective of improvement in network design will therefore require
further specifications related to the physical or hydrological attributes of water distribution
systems, drop in the operational concepts such as network efficiency in delivery of the utility
as measured against the costs associated with the improvement in design. Such an assess-
ment may ideally take into account the real world system specifications such as the potential
differences between the network nodes to distinguish between the sinks, sources and other
junctions in order to emphasize the demand for water. In addition, graph links may be
allocated with weighting factors to specify physical attributes such as pipe length, capacity
or the cost. Other function specific information such as geographical characteristics and
flow direction to name but a few may also prove useful in a more comprehensive analysis
of resilience in water distribution networks. This analysis however, as the first steps in
this direction, demonstrates that techniques from graph theory and network physics are
invaluable tools towards the assessment of infrastructure network robustness and better un-
derstanding their structural vulnerabilities for the practice of alternative designs. Findings
in this area may be used as the guidelines for the implementation of protective measures by
risk managers and will help engineers who are concerned about the design and construction
of optimally-connected next-generation water distribution networks.
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